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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on raising concern that anxiety–performance
relationship theory has insufﬁciently catered for motoric issues
during, primarily, closed and self-paced skill execution (e.g., long
jump and javelin throw). Following a review of current theory, we
address the under-consideration of motoric issues by extending
the three-dimensional model put forward by Cheng, Hardy, and
Markland (2009) (‘Toward a three-dimensional conceptualization of
performance anxiety: Rationale and initial measurement
development, Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 10, 271–278). This
fourth dimension, termed skill establishment, comprises the level
and consistency of movement automaticity together with a
performer’s conﬁdence in this speciﬁc process, as providing a
degree of robustness against negative anxiety effects. To exemplify
this motoric inﬂuence, we then offer insight regarding current
theories’ misrepresentation that a self-focus of attention toward an
already well-learned skill always leads to a negative performance
effect. In doing so, we draw upon applied literature to distinguish
between positive and negative self-foci and suggest that on what
and how a performer directs their attention is crucial to the
interaction with skill establishment and, therefore, performance.
Finally, implications for skill acquisition research are provided.
Accordingly, we suggest a positive potential ﬂow from applied/
translational to fundamental/theory-generating research in sport
which can serve to freshen and usefully redirect investigation into
this long-considered but still insufﬁciently understood concept.
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Frequent occurrence of ‘choking’ under pressure (i.e., performing below one’s and others’
expectations in consideration of previously demonstrated ability) has led to a high volume
of research output in an effort to understand the fragility of technique under high-anxiety
conditions (e.g., Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Collins, Jones, Fairweather, Doolan,
& Priestley, 2001; Gucciardi, Longbottom, Jackson, & Dimmock, 2010), and attempts to
intervene by providing strategies to counter the onset of debilitating mechanisms (e.g.,
Lam, Maxwell, & Masters, 2009; Mesagno, Marchant, & Morris, 2008; Vine & Wilson,
2010). As such, a practitioner’s ability to consistently select the most appropriate interven-
tion is dependent on their level of mechanistic understanding (i.e., declarative knowledge
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of ‘what needs to be done’ and ‘why’). Crucially, practitioners’ knowledge is likely to be
reliant on ideas presented by theory; therefore, it is important that theory can accurately
explain the choking phenomenon.
Consequently, consideration of recent theory to explain the anxiety–performance (A–P)
relationship forms the central focus of this article. Speciﬁcally, while it is recognized that
anxiety impacts at different stages of perception, selection, and action during the perform-
ance behavior (cf. Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012), this article focuses on raising concern
that current theory has insufﬁciently catered for motoric issues within the action
(execution) stage of performance, this insufﬁciency being apparent through an under/mis-
representation of important factors.
As a brief overview, we suggest that these under/misrepresented issues fall into two
broad categories. The ﬁrst relates to how the movement is represented within a perfor-
mer’s long-term memory. Speciﬁcally, we refer to the level and consistency of automaticity
across the different movement components, and a performer’s speciﬁc conﬁdence in this
automaticity during stressful situations. When high, these factors can serve to practically
make a skill ‘anxiety-proof’; typically, a ‘ﬂow’ (Jackson, 1996; Swann, Piggott, Crust,
Keegan, & Hemmings, 2015) performance would characterize this approach. As will be
explained, we refer to these factors as skill establishment, later formalized as the fourth
dimension in an attempt to extend Cheng, Hardy, and Markland’s (2009) three-dimen-
sional model to explain the A–P relationship. The second category relates to the more
commonly considered situation in which a performer may consciously focus on controlling
aspects of the movement execution. In this case, we explore research which shows that
this situation has often been uncritically considered (or at least operationalized during
empirical investigation) as always negative for performance; the misrepresentation
referred to above. In fact, there is considerable evidence to suggest that certain types
of self-foci are both positive for performance and an important element in assisting ath-
letes to control potentially negative impacts of anxiety.
Taken together, these under/misrepresentations suggest the need for greater emphasis
on motoric issues in the A–P relationship. In organizing this article there are four distinct
objectives: (1) we review mainstream A–P relationship theories to provide a brief back-
ground of well-researched ideas, followed immediately by prominent contemporary the-
ories which have attempted to overcome an apparent dichotomy between self-focus and
distraction mechanisms. This review is not aimed at being comprehensive, but rather to
highlight the main trends in choking theory to date; (2) based on these reviews, we intro-
duce an additional motoric dimension (i.e., skill establishment) to extend current concep-
tualizations of the A–P relationship; (3) using applied research, we clarify a confusion
within the literature by assessing circumstances in which conscious control can be positive
or is likely to lead to a negative performance outcome, therefore considering the impor-
tance of skill establishment when explaining self-focus effects; and (4) we raise future con-
siderations within skill acquisition and A–P relationship research.
Current explanations of the A–P relationship
Until recently there has been a dichotomy between distraction (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992;
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) and self-focus (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Masters,
1992) theories to explain the A–P relationship (see Hill, Hanton, Matthews, & Fleming,
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2010 for a review of other previous models). In summary, advocates of distraction
theories – speciﬁcally Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) – posit that
worry inhibits performers’ ability to resist distraction from task-irrelevant (threat-related)
stimuli. Moreover, worry causes an imbalance between the stimulus- and goal-directed
attentional systems. The stimulus-directed system responds to behaviorally relevant
sensory events, whereas the goal-directed system regulates expectations, knowledge,
and current goals. Worrying results in an increased inﬂuence of the stimulus-driven
system. To overcome this imbalance and avoid a negative outcome, increased processing
resources and storage capacity of the working memory are invested. Consequently, atten-
tion allocated to task-relevant stimuli and information processing efﬁciency is reduced.
In contrast, proponents of self-focus theories posit that pressurized situations increase
anxiety and self-consciousness about performing well, inducing conscious processing
during skill execution. For example, Masters (1992) suggested that consciously controlling
technique through ‘reinvestment’ leads to eventual breakdown in performance, where
reinvestment refers to the ‘manipulation of conscious, explicit, rule based knowledge,
by working memory, to control the mechanics of one’s movements during motor
output’ (Masters & Maxwell, 2004, p. 208) or ‘the tendency to direct conscious attention
to the mechanical details of how the skill should be performed’ (Masters, 2008, p. 90).
However, Beilock and Carr (2001) later proposed that conscious monitoring of the skill is
responsible for skill failure. While the distinction between control and monitoring could
relate to a number of different things, both hold disruptive potential due to an effortful
increase in conscious awareness of proceduralized skills which reverses the normally auto-
matic processes governing well-learned execution to a dysfunctional state that is more
representative of earlier stage learners (Fitts & Posner, 1967).
Optimistically, however, several proposals have emerged from this dichotomous
debate (distraction vs. self-focus) as offering potential resolution. One proposal comes
from Beilock and colleagues’ research (e.g., Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, & Carr, 2004;
Beilock & Carr, 2005; Beilock, Kulp, Holt, & Carr, 2004). According to these authors,
anxiety can disrupt well-learned skill execution by at least two different mechanisms,
creating a ‘double whammy’ (Beilock, Jellison, Rydell, McConnell, & Carr, 2006, p. 1062)
effect. The mechanism depends on the manner in which a task is represented and
implemented, coupled with aspects of the pressure situation. Accordingly, anxiety initially
reduces attention directed toward task-relevant information by overloading working
memory with task-irrelevant worrying thoughts (viz., distraction theories). The second
whammy, as a result of such worry, coaxes performers to consciously attend to skill
execution in a step-by-step fashion; thus the allocation of attention, even if quantitatively
sufﬁcient for the task, is counterproductive. As such, developments from this perspective
remain grounded in attentional mechanisms.
Alternatively to Beilock and colleagues’ explanation, Cheng et al. (2009) proposed a
three-dimensional model to conceptualize the A–P relationship. The cognitive dimension
comprises negative responses of worry and self-focused attention to perceived threat.
Similarly to Beilock and colleagues’ explanation, worry and self-focused attention act sep-
arately, since consciously controlling movements as a result of anxious self-focus is not
contained within worrying thoughts. Self-focused attention can be directed toward the
execution, performance shortcomings, and negative cognitions, usually typiﬁed by self-
preoccupation with thoughts of ‘personal lack’ or weaknesses (notably, a lack of general
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self-conﬁdence). A second dimension represents the inﬂuence of physiological responses
invoked by the autonomous nervous system in the forms of autonomous hyperactivity and
somatic tension. Whereas autonomous hyperactive responses stem from involuntary
muscles associated with the inner organs, leading to cold sweat, elevated heart rate,
and breathlessness, somatic tension relates to responses from motor-orientated voluntary
muscle groups, such as tension, trembling, and fatigue. Thirdly, and ﬁnally, the regulatory
dimension refers to the performer’s level of perceived control, that is, the perceptions of
one’s capability to cope and achieve goals in stressful situations (cf. Jones, 1995). It is inter-
esting to consider whether this third element is highly task speciﬁc (i.e., self-efﬁcacy) or a
more global, ‘I can control myself whatever’ construct. This speciﬁc issue is outside our
purpose in the present article, although inspection of the way in which Cheng et al. oper-
ationalize this construct should offer some insight. For the present purpose, however, and
in this regard, the regulatory dimension relates to favorable expectations and an intended
adaptive capacity. Accordingly, the interactions between the cognitive, physiological, and
regulatory dimensions are proposed to better predict the A–P relationship.
In presenting these latter explanations, we acknowledge and applaud the signiﬁcant
contributions that have been offered. Indeed, complexity within the human condition is
inevitable and something that should always be considered when working with athletes
(cf. Collins et al., 2012). As such, formalized models which can present, explain, and
realize this complexity within applied environments offer great potential when planning
interventions. Crucially, however, upon closer examination of these explanations and
other empirical research (e.g., Lohse, Sherwood, & Healy, 2010; Porter, Ostrowski, Nolan,
& Wu, 2010; Wulf & Su, 2007), we ﬁrstly raise concern that there seems to be an underre-
presented dimension, notably, how well-established the skill is with the performer (see
below). Secondly, and extending this motoric inﬂuence, we raise concern over the
claims central to, and implicit within, these theories that a self-focus of attention is
always disruptive toward performance (i.e., referring to the interaction between cognitive
and motoric dimensions). Accordingly, as scientist-practitioners we call into question the
veracity of these approaches to optimally guide both theory-building investigation and
applied coaching practice. In order to overcome these limitations, the following section
proposes extension of the existing three dimensions, suggesting consideration of a new
four-dimensional model.1 Subsequently, we aim to address the contentious issue and con-
fusion surrounding self-focused attention by considering data from applied literature
alongside this new motoric dimension.
The fourth dimension: Skill establishment
Based on the ideas presented in the preceding sections, we suggest that a more formal-
ized motoric consideration is essential for a comprehensive mechanistic theory of the A–P
relationship. For clarity of message, we primarily emphasize the execution of self-paced
tasks in this article, where there is, at the least, a compelling case for consideration of
motoric factors, notably an uncommon feature in A–P studies to date. Building on the
three-dimensional model (Cheng et al., 2009), we suggest that this represents a fourth
dimension for inclusion in future work. In contrast to existing theories’ predominant
focus on factors of emotion, information perception, and nature of attentional focus,
skill establishment concerns the structures/representations of the movement on which
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these other factors act. Speciﬁcally, we refer to the level and consistency of automaticity
governing the different movement components that comprise a skill, together with a per-
former’s level of conﬁdence in this process under anxiety symptoms (i.e., ‘I know that the
skill is anxiety-proof’). These confer a level of robustness to the skill against negative
anxiety effects through a conscious process of trust in the skill (cf. Moore & Stevenson,
1994). Whereas the previous three dimensions directly account for perturbations in
close proximity to and during the anxiety episode, skill establishment concerns processes
related to motor execution that are developed through long-term training experiences, or
at least by repeated good ones (i.e., overlearning of the retrieval process; cf. Bjork & Bjork,
1992), as we explain later in more detail. In this regard, high skill establishment is some-
thing that coaches often strive to achieve in their athletes when developing motor
skills. Accordingly, exemplar studies from psychological and neuroscientiﬁc perspectives
are highlighted below to demonstrate these components of skill establishment.
We should also highlight at this point that skill establishment is not the same as skill
level. Skill level implies a measure of performance outcome, whereas skill establishment
relates simply to aspects governing motor control, although it would not be unexpected
that higher-skilled performers possess more well-established skills, since they are usually
more experienced. As an example of this in the applied context, consider the mid-handi-
cap golfer who has a consistent but not necessarily most effective technique; that is, they
are sub-elite but very experienced.
Automaticity
From amechanistic perspective, Logan (1988) proposed automaticity to represent a single-
step, as opposed to multi-step, memory retrieval process. With automaticity, attention is
shifted from focusing on movement components to higher-order aspects of the skill that
are concernedwith integration, therefore reducing the number of steps required to retrieve
the skill from long-termmemory. Contrary to traditional dual-mode views, however, that of
movement being either automatic or controlled (see Bargh, 1989), automaticity need not
necessarily be considered consistent across all components of the skill; that is, different
aspects of the movement representation/structure can express higher levels of automatic
activation than others. Indeed, this alternative explanation remains possible even when
employing Shiffrin and Schneider’s (1977) information-processing model, since retrieval
initiation via conscious processing is a distinct step in the process of execution. In addition,
during conscious retrieval of a component from long-term memory, associated com-
ponents are indirectly processed with reduced or automatic activation thresholds, repre-
senting a more efﬁcient integration (or association/chunking) of related skill components
as a holistic process. Therefore, automaticity should be considered as a gradual construct,
existing at both temporal and spatial levels during skill execution and, thus, there are mul-
tiple routes to achieving higher levels of entire skill activation. In short, successful perform-
ance may not solely rely on movement components being activated automatically,
providing that they are activated correctly. When entire skills are highly, if not totally, auto-
matic, however, this corresponds to the ﬂow experiences mentioned earlier (for a review of
automaticity from a theoretical and conceptual perspective, seeMoors & De Houwer, 2006).
Furthermore, theory has offered detail regarding the structure and storage of move-
ment representations which, in turn, helps to ‘unpack’ the implications for generating
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SPORT AND EXERCISE PSYCHOLOGY 5
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high levels of automaticity. For example, according to Paivio’s (1971, 1986) Dual-Coding
Theory, a high level of movement automaticity would be present if motor representations
(or codes) were predominantly stored using the multisensory nonverbal, as opposed to
verbal, coding system. A highly associated network of multisensory codes would ensure
a most vivid, and therefore complete, representation of the entire skill, offering a
number of different retrieval routes. Finally, strong retrieval cues increase the activation
of this network. In fact, access to the nonverbal system may even be facilitated via a refer-
ential connection with the verbal system. As such, arousal of a single verbal code could
functionally activate others in the nonverbal system through less-conscious attention
(see Clark & Paivio, 1991 for a review). We will return to this idea later. Repeated use of
this process would increase the likelihood of future activation with greater ease (see
also the Bio-informational Theory of emotion and imagery; Lang, 1979). In short, the
extent to which a broad network of motor representations are energized by a single stimu-
lus, either consciously or subconsciously mediated, is an important feature of automaticity.
Crucially, however, it must be recognized that the storage and activation strength of this
network is highly idiosyncratic across athletes; that is, the technique and control demon-
strated by one athlete is inevitably different to another. Based on this process, we now
highlight several domains of study which exemplify these performer characteristics
before addressing the second factor within skill establishment, the performer’s conﬁdence
in automaticity.
Mirror neuron system
Reﬂecting a neural account of automaticity, the discovery of a mirror neuron system
during action observation (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Rizzo-
latti et al., 1988; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996) has provided a useful ‘tool’ for
assessing what has been described as one’s ‘vocabulary of motor acts’ (Rizzolatti et al.,
1988, p. 491). Indeed, mirror neurons are also functional, since ‘our ability to interpret
the actions of others requires the involvement of our own motor system’ (Kilner &
Lemon, 2013, p. 1057).
Perhaps the most important ﬁnding from this research, at least when discussing
motoric issues, is the association between cortical motor region (e.g., primary motor
and premotor cortex) activity and observers’ previous experience of executing, not only
watching, the skills presented. For example, using fMRI assessment, Calvo-Merino,
Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, and Haggard (2005) compared neural responses from
expert ballet and capoeira performers with novices when observing complex routines
associated with the two performance styles. Greater blood oxygenated level-dependent
responses were found within experts’ motor cortex; however, inter-expert differences
were also evident when distinguishing between performance style. Performers showed
higher activation when observing the style that most closely matched their own motor
repertoire. Further reﬂecting a motoric, as opposed to visual or theoretical knowledge-
based, foundation to the mirror neuron system, Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham,
and Haggard (2006) then compared professional male and female ballet dancers observ-
ing gender-speciﬁc and gender-common ballet routines. Despite all participants posses-
sing an understanding and visual representation of the speciﬁc moves – since training
and performance occur collectively – data showed that neuronal responses depend on
observers’ motor expertise for sets of overlearned and stereotypic actions; that is, doing
6 H. J. CARSON AND D. COLLINS
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the behavior. Most interestingly, the same ﬁndings are shown when athletes hear familiar
versus unfamiliar sports sounds (Woods, Hernandez, Wagner, & Beilock, 2014).
Interpreting these ﬁndings using Paivio’s (1971, 1986) Dual-Coding Theory, this most
probably reﬂects a more complete representation of the movement within the multisen-
sory nonverbal system (since execution relies on more than just visual information proces-
sing). Additionally, the higher level of activation relates to the motor representations’ high
ease of access, since merely observing/hearing the stimuli resulted in distinct activation.
In summary, mirror neuron system activity suggests an index of motoric familiarity, per-
sonal meaning, congruence, and automaticity, all of which share similarity with the skill
establishment dimension. Findings of consistent perceptual and motoric neural activation
within these studies conﬁrm the functional interplay between the two systems when gen-
erating skilled movement patterns. As such, we believe this adds to our argument for
greater consideration of motor structures/representations when explaining the A–P
relationship alongside factors inﬂuencing the perceptual system.
Especial skills
Automaticitymay also be inferred using performance outcomemeasures, not only between
but also within skills. This can be exempliﬁed by recent study of the especial skill (cf. Keetch,
Schmidt, Lee, & Young, 2005), ‘a highly speciﬁc skill embedded within a more general class
of motor skills’ (Stöckel & Breslin, 2013, p. 536). Predominantly reported in basketball free
throwing, the skill is represented by a violation of the negative linear relationship
between shot successes and increasing distance, predicted by the force × variability
hypothesis (Keetch et al., 2005). At the free throw regulation distance, performance is sig-
niﬁcantly better than would be predicted using regression analyses. It is currently hypoth-
esized that, following massive amounts of practice, the especial skill could be underpinned
by an enhanced parameter speciﬁcation and selection process (learned parameter hypoth-
esis; Breslin, Hodges, Kennedy, Hanlon, & Williams, 2010), which is mediated by the visual
context (visual context hypothesis; Keetch, Lee, & Schmidt, 2008) whereby speciﬁc visual
cues are encoded as part of the memory representation (Breslin, Schmidt, & Lee, 2012).
The suggestion of a more efﬁcient and enhanced memory retrieval process is thus in line
with opinion that automaticity involves a single-step mechanism. The fact that visual infor-
mationmight form part of the associative representation network also adds strength to the
arguments presented by Paivio (1971, 1986) and Lang (1979), in that sensory information
forms an important component of the memory/cell assembly trace. While research in this
area is still in its early stages, such ﬁndings clearly demonstrate the differential impact on
performance success caused by superior motoric functions and, we suggest, skill establish-
ment. However, we should highlight that it is currently unknown through empirical testing
whether the especial skill is more resistant to the negative effects of competitive pressure.
On the basis of content in this article, our expectation would be that it is.
Conﬁdence in the process of automaticity
Returning to the components of skill establishment, robust sport-conﬁdence has recently
been conceptualized as ‘a set of enduring, yet malleable positive beliefs that protect
against the ongoing psychological and environmental challenges associated with com-
petitive sport’ (Thomas, Lane, & Kingston, 2011, p. 194). Accordingly, these ideas appear
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aptly contained within skill establishment, since it suggests a developed mental state
which counters the onset of a negative self-focus. Notably, within this multidimensional
set of beliefs are ‘durable’ and ‘protective’ characteristics. As such, durability indicates a
strong, long-lasting, and generally high (but not over or false) level of conﬁdence,
whereas the protective characteristic more directly supports the functional role provided
when performing under high competitive anxiety. Speciﬁcally, the protective character-
istic is reported by experienced elite-level performers as enabling resistance to conﬁ-
dence-debilitating factors (e.g., injury, pressure, and high expectation from others), a
protective layer, and shock absorption in the day-to-day ﬂuctuations in conﬁdence. There-
fore, robust sport-conﬁdence can be viewed as providing long-term security to the single-
step memory retrieval process, making the process less likely to suffer motoric faults (that
is not to say that the movement is invariant; cf. Müller & Sternad, 2004).
Crucially, however, we suggest that this is the case when robust conﬁdence pertains to
aspects of speciﬁc skill execution and processes involved in automaticity (i.e., the athlete’s
imagery/self-focus is able to activate the required motor structures). Indeed, Hays,
Maynard, Thomas, and Bawden (2007) highlight that, among world-class athletes,
quality skill repetition and overlearning constitute part of a global preparatory source of
conﬁdence. For example, one athlete reported: ‘If I do things correctly in training and
get things like skills and techniques right, then I become more conﬁdent’ (p. 439). Further-
more, skill execution was also reported as a speciﬁc type of conﬁdence by 71% of these
athletes. In short, when performers are not conﬁdent in processes governing a speciﬁc
motor execution, then emphasis on a negative self-focus is more likely under conditions
of high anxiety; that is, a conscious focus on aspects of the movement representation
that do not generate whole skill activation. As highlighted earlier, such ideas are also sup-
ported by the notion of trust. According to Moore and Stevenson (1994), trust enables the
expression of automaticity by removing thoughts of fear pertaining to skill execution or
outcome. Therefore, a high level of trust infers conﬁdence in one’s level and consistency
of automaticity for that speciﬁc skill.
In summary, high-level skill establishment necessitates the combined inﬂuence of
movement automaticity and conﬁdence in that process; both must be present for
optimal security under high-pressure conditions. Additionally, it should be emphasized
that a high level of automaticity, and indeed conﬁdence, does not always mean a low
level of anxiety (e.g., somatic reaction) or emotional inﬂuence (e.g., feeling ‘psyched
up’). Indeed, anxiety and emotion are often considered essential constructs to achieving
an individually optimal performance zone (cf. Hanin, 2007; Ruiz & Hanin, 2004). Finally,
in providing a case for motoric consideration, we hope to have qualiﬁed our claims of
an underrepresentation by existing A–P relationship theory.
Moving forward, we now direct greater attention toward our second concern, the mis-
representation of motoric-related issues. Speciﬁcally, the following section addresses self-
focus (cognitive dimension) effects on skilled technique during high-anxiety conditions.
Additionally, we provide critical insight from motoric factors to interpret contradictory
ﬁndings between theoretical and applied literature. Accordingly, our interpretation
explains why a self-focus of attention is not always negative. In doing so, we distinguish
between two different types of self-focus, one that is ‘positive’ and another ‘negative’.
As a precursor, however, we highlight the origins of our particular concern as a state of
confusion within the literature.
8 H. J. CARSON AND D. COLLINS
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The nature of self-focused attention: To ‘what’ and ‘how’ attention is
applied
Within the three-dimensional model, it is suggested that any form of self-focus negatively
contributes to the A–P relationship, whereby ‘self-focus refers explicitly to an attentional
shift towards the self’ (Cheng et al., 2009, p. 272). Indeed, within the anxiety measure
tested, self-focus is framed as ‘I am very conscious of every movement I make’ (p. 276).
Such deﬁnition of self-focus is not unique to this model; for example, reinvestment
theory (Masters & Maxwell, 2008) also proposes that consciously controlling mechanics
during execution leads to performance breakdown (Masters, 1992). Accordingly, from
these explanations, it would appear that successful execution is hindered by a conscious,
self-focused intervention.
Somewhat more positively, however, Beilock and colleagues appear to interpret a nega-
tive ‘self-’ or ‘skill-focus’ as focusing on ‘a component process of well-learned performance’
(Beilock, Bertenthal, et al., 2004, p. 373) or ‘paying too much attention to task control and
guidance’ (Jackson & Beilock, 2008, p. 106 [emphasis added]), which serves to disrupt auto-
matic processes during execution. Indeed, kinematic research supports this suggestion by
demonstrating disruption to functional variability when employing a speciﬁc part-skill
focus (Carson, Collins, & Richards, 2014; MacPherson, Collins, & Morriss, 2008). Thus, and
in contrast to Cheng et al.’s interpretation, we believe these authors acknowledge some
role for conscious attention during optimal execution, especially since the attention
referred to is explicitly implicated with skill components that are usually run ‘ofﬂine’.
However, it is difﬁcult to garner much more from this attentional strategy, such as the
aspects of execution which do run ‘online’, since the majority (if not all) of their studies
compare skill-focused and dual-task conditions (e.g., attending to an auditory tone or per-
forming an alphabet arithmetic task; Beilock, Bertenthal, et al., 2004; Beilock & Carr, 2001;
Beilock et al., 2006) or executing under time restrictions (e.g., Beilock, Bertenthal, et al.,
2004). As such, recommendations on how attention should be implemented are general-
ized to allocating ‘attention to aspects of performance that are not directly involved in the
online control of skill execution’ (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002, p. 15), including
tactical strategy, external visual cues, and employing time-restricted pre-performance
routines – in short, non-motoric aspects of the skill. It has even been suggested that ‘for
real-time execution by experts, there may be truth in the Nike motto “Just do it”’
(Beilock, Bertenthal, et al., 2004, p. 379; see also the older and more explicitly applied
ideas on trust, cf. Moore & Stevenson, 1994). Therefore, if our interpretation of self-
focused attention in these studies is correct, the link between mechanistic understanding
and implications for practice is somewhat incoherent. In other words, the authors suggest
that paying attention to aspects of skill that are normally subconsciously controlled results
in a negative outcome and therefore one should not think about the skill. The confusion
has arisen because there has been no recommendation regarding what would happen if
the performer attended to aspects of the skill which normally did operate under conscious
control; would this be positive? Either this explanation shares the same view of automati-
city as Cheng et al. (2009) and Masters (1992), suggesting that any self-focus of attention to
skilled technique is always negative, or it is incomplete. In developing this idea, we suggest
that inclusion of skill establishment could offer a more complete account, especially when
considered against our upcoming review of applied and empirical research.
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Furthermore, these issues are confounded by variable operationalization of motoric-
related issues in A–P studies, for example the coverage of attentional control by a
single questionnaire item: ‘I am very conscious of every movement I make’ (Cheng
et al., 2009, p. 276). As another example of this potential ambiguity, Beilock and Gonso
(2008) employed an imagery intervention under speeded and actual pace instructions
in order to manipulate conscious focus prior to a putting task. However, virtually no
detail is provided regarding what the participants focused on during the movement
(including the modality in which it was recommended, if any), only that ‘participants
were told that they would be imaging themselves performing a number of golf putts
… in their mind’ (p. 925) and only up until ball contact (i.e., not the completed action).
As we stress in the next section, to what and how self-focused attention is applied are
crucial pieces to the complex A–P relationship, since they inﬂuence the activation level
of motor structures/representations in long-term memory. In summary, current expla-
nations of the A–P relationship advocate no facilitative role for self-focused attention, or
fail to expand sufﬁciently when explaining the attentional mechanisms that are/are not
harmful to performance.
An applied perspective on countering anxiety: Positive self-focus
Contrary to self-focused attention disrupting performance under high-anxiety conditions,
several studies have in fact found beneﬁt from a self-focus (Carson, Collins, & Jones, 2014;
MacPherson et al., 2008; Mullen & Hardy, 2010). This indicates, therefore, that the nature of
self-focus is more complex than currently being suggested by anxiety theories, and within
some experimental studies (e.g., Abdollahipour, Wulf, Psotta, & Palomo Nieto, 2015; Lohse
et al., 2010; Weiss, Reber, & Owen, 2008; Wulf & Su, 2007) examining effects of attention on
learning and performance; that is, self-focused attention has often been erroneously/too
simplistically investigated (cf. Peh, Chow, & Davids, 2011). Recent challenge to the idea
that successful execution is devoid of conscious attention is readily apparent within the
applied sport (see Toner & Moran, 2014; Winter, MacPherson, & Collins, 2014) and exercise
(e.g., Schücker, Knopf, Strauss, & Hagemann, 2014) psychology literature. Conclusions
suggest that it is not thinking per se that is problematic, but rather what the performer
thinks about and how.
Addressing the former of these two factors, holistic thoughts which summarize the
movement’s entirety act as a ‘screen’ or ‘buffer’ frommaladaptive cognitions and as a posi-
tive route to enhanced memory retrieval (Winter et al., 2014). According to MacPherson
et al. (2008), temporally accurate rhythmical cues act as a ‘source of information’
(p. 289) by raising awareness of helpful information about timing.2 This, in turn, prevents
the skill from being processed as fragmented parts, which does seem to be an almost uni-
formly negative self-focus, while maintaining focus on task-relevant information. In other
words, focus on rhythmicity acts to entrain the different movement components within
the motor memory trace with seemingly lower requirement for conscious attention.
Indeed, this form of processing remains underpinned by the efﬁcient integration of a cor-
tical and subcortical neural network (MacPherson, Collins, & Obhi, 2009). As such, it is
unsurprising that consistently timed movements are most often associated with superior
performance outcomes (MacPherson, Collins, Graham-Smith, & Turner, 2013), even when
improvements in timing are trained in isolation of the task (Sommer & Rönnqvist, 2009),
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and holistic rhythm-based cues are reported by highly skilled performers in closed skill
sports such as golf (Cotterill, Sanders, & Collins, 2010) and javelin throwing (Collins,
Morriss, & Trower, 1999). Addressing how a holistic focus might be employed (the latter
of our two factors), these are often multisensory, reﬂecting the use of holistic auditory
cues (see also MacPherson et al., 2008). For example, and in line with the auditory
mirror neuron research presented earlier (Woods et al., 2014), one tennis player explains:
If you’re really visualizing something long then you are aware of the sounds because different
balls have different sounds. Balls sound different when they are sliced; it sounds different than
a topspin ball. The sound can be really important because if you imagine what it sounds like to
hit a slice backhand, which has a different sound than a topspin, it gets you in the mindset.
(Munroe, Giacobbi, Hall, & Weinberg, 2000, p. 131)
Supporting part of an optimally activated and multisensory motor neuronal network (cf.
Holmes & Collins, 2001), elite-level performers also attend to holistic proprioceptive cues.
For instance, one European Tour professional golfer described ‘feelings that are more con-
nected to bigger muscles and to the full motion, rather than [my] little right ﬁnger’s going
to do this or that’ (Carson, Collins, & MacNamara, 2013, p. 75). Such a holistic sense of ‘feel’,
according to Toner and Moran (2014), may even be a direct strategy of elite performers to
prevent total subconscious control, affording adaptability to subtle differences within the
performance environment when required (cf. Christensen, Sutton, & McIlwain, in press).
Indeed, Bargh (1994) also suggests that movements may only rarely exhibit themselves
as totally automatic, reﬂecting the infrequency of ﬂow states, which is quite apart from
the implications of dual-task experiments and current explanations of the A–P relationship.
In other words, the low ecological validity of experimental tasks has perhaps overesti-
mated the level of automaticity across every aspect of the skills being executed.
Reﬂecting these various studies and our earlier discussion on multiple routes toward
automatic execution, we suggest that holistic thoughts may provide an optimal pathway
for activating important components of a skill as well as associated subcomponents (cf.
Paivio, 1971, 1986), thus making complete and correct retrieval of the whole skill more
likely. There is, however, a requirement for these motor components to be ﬁrmly rep-
resented and associated if they are to activate under such a broad internal self-focus. In con-
trast, and in spite of our earlier observation that a focus on movement components is
usually negative under high-anxiety conditions, it may even be that such a part-skill
focus can work if the component focused on is crucial to and causative of good perform-
ance. As Bortoli, Bertollo, Hanin, and Robazza (2012) explain in the context of target
sports, focusing on ‘the accurate execution of the core components of the shooting
action should “neutralise” the dysfunctional effects of distress’ (p. 695). Notably, core com-
ponents are not those which remain automated (and therefore unchanged) under high-
anxiety conditions, but rather those which digress and signify poor performances.3 Appli-
cation of this ‘action approach’ with Olympic-level shooters demonstrated that accurate
execution of these skill components by conscious control moderated the A–P relationship
(Bortoli et al., 2012). To exemplify the importance of focusing on the correct skill com-
ponent, and supporting our earlier critique that theory had erroneously misinterpreted
foci effects, Beilock, Bertenthal, et al. (2004) showed skilled golfers’ performance to
degrade when attending to the putter swing path in a skill-focus condition. However, on
the basis of later research by Karlsen, Smith, and Nilsson (2008), it appears that the
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swing path is only accountable for 17% of putting accuracy variance in elite-level golfers.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that performance was worse, since the targeted focus was
not particularly useful for the outcome (i.e., a negative self-focus). As such, focus on a
single causative feature, or switching between them (e.g., switching from gun alignment
and sight picture to trigger pull at the right time and in the right way; cf. Loze, Collins, &
Holmes, 2001), may underpin the majority of successful elite-level performances.
To summarize to what attention is directed, a holistic self-focus appears to help activate
a broad number of skill subcomponents under low-level consciousness, whereas a core
component(s) self-focus works effectively when the other important components
remain correctly activated during the anxiety response. Both, therefore, positively
prompt athletes toward attaining higher levels of overall automaticity. In addition to ben-
eﬁting under high-anxiety conditions, a holistic focus of attention appears to also offer a
practical solution when attempting executions with reduced conscious control over single
aspects of complex skills, for instance during re-automation following a technical reﬁne-
ment (cf. Carson & Collins, 2011, 2014).
Finally, and as brieﬂy addressed already when referring to multisensory information
processing, how these different stimuli are attended to is an important factor in under-
standing the A–P relationship (cf. Holmes & Collins, 2001). Crucially, in order to prevent
a negative outcome, self-focused attention must resonate effectively with the movement
representation/structure and be appropriate for the task being performed. For example, by
overemphasizing one particular imagery modality when nonverbal codes are best inter-
related (Ernst & Banks, 2002; Guillot et al., 2009), applying an inappropriate perspective
(White & Hardy, 1995), or focusing on stimuli that are unrepresentative of the motor
system’s repertoire (e.g., a competitor’s technique) can differentially guide the balance
of attention required for a speciﬁc task (Guillot & Collet, 2008). Reﬂecting this ﬁnal
example, such a suboptimal effect can be interpreted within the earlier reported mirror
neuron ﬁndings by Calvo-Merino et al. (2006).
Likewise, a positive self-focus may be applied by attending to motorically appropriate
‘mood words’ which accurately resonate with the to-be-performed skill. This, therefore,
may offer a better balance between verbal and nonverbal retrieval processes explained
by Paivio’s (1971, 1986) Dual-Coding Theory;4 that is, activation of a powerfully resonant
verbal code serves to automatically activate associated motor networks within the nonver-
bal system. For instance, Mullen and Hardy (2010) reported consistent beneﬁts from using
holistic (e.g., drive, thrust, smooth, glide, and soft) as opposed to part-process goals (e.g.,
arch back, hips up, wrists ﬁrm, and square blade) when executing under anxiety conditions
in long jump, basketball free throwing, and golf putting (see also Gucciardi & Dimmock,
2008; MacPherson et al., 2009). Indeed, this idea has been prevalent in the applied litera-
ture for many years (cf. Rushall, 1979, 1984; Rushall & Shewchuck, 1989). Crucially,
however, considering the individuality of technique, the epitome of mood words must
hold personal meaning for each performer and be able to represent the technique if it
is intended to optimally aid memory retrieval (e.g., the number of syllables and articula-
tion; MacPherson et al., 2009). As such, verbalized and explicit knowledge about a skill
is not always detrimental to performance if it serves the function of facilitating holistic
motoric activation.
Taking these two aspects (what and how) of self-focus together, we suggest that an
appropriate motoric consideration can inform a positive self-focus; in contrast, when
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these two factors are ill-considered the resultant self-focus is most likely negative. Such
detailed discussion and interpretation offers important guidance to sport psychologists
about the mental requirements of athletes during situations of high competitive
anxiety. Of course, we suspect that much of this will not be entirely novel to applied psy-
chologists (cf. Winter & Collins, 2015); after all, is addressing this challenge not the inten-
tion of imagery training? Indeed, as applied sport psychologists we actively encourage
performers to employ a self-focus by means of mental imagery (Cotterill, 2011; MacPher-
son et al., 2009) and, from anecdotal evidence at least, it is apparent that elite-level ath-
letes employ a self-focus to positive effect (Clarey, 2014; Collins, 2011). Therefore, it
seems, to us at least, erroneous that A–P relationship theory should recommend its
non-use. If mental imagery is to be employed, however, we reiterate the need for
greater motoric consideration when applying these mental skills. Accordingly, we now
address the issue of preventing a negative A–P relationship occurring, or at least signiﬁ-
cantly reducing the likelihood of one when acquiring skills. In contrast to research that
aims to explain the A–P relationship, such problem solving has received relatively
limited investigation, something we suggest needs to increase.
Practical future considerations for anxiety and performance within
research and coaching practice
Probably the most researched proposal to counter a negative A–P relationship is implicit
motor learning (Masters, 1992). The principal assumption of this theory is that performers
will not consciously reinvest in explicit, rule-based knowledge to control their movements
if they do not accrue such knowledge during the course of learning. As such, an underpin-
ning feature of implicit learning is practicing motor skills without conscious attention
directed toward the mechanics involved, particularly through use of verbalized and/or
written instructions. Examples of implicit learning within the experimental literature
include minimizing errors during early learning (Maxwell, Masters, Kerr, & Weedon,
2001; Poolton, Masters, & Maxwell, 2005), presenting marginally perceptible outcome
feedback (Masters, Maxwell, & Eves, 2009), and executing under dual-task conditions
(Gabbett, Wake, & Abernethy, 2010; Masters, 1992), all of which are intended to prevent
working memory from consciously processing aspects of technique.
Despite the clear origin of this theory, however, we believe that advice to learn a skill in an
entirely implicit fashion (many aspects, if not most, involved in learning are in fact implicit)5 is
both practically impossible and somewhat misdirecting coaches in their efforts to develop
high-level athletes. Firstly, it seems virtually impossible to coach athletes implicitly over
long-term time scales, unless the skill is incredibly simple. Therefore, it might work for
some limited, laboratory-focused skills and situations (cf. Beek, 2000) but is unlikely to be a
practical solution for complex whole body skills that are learned and performed in applied
environments. Indeed, Gabbett and Masters (2011) concede that it is not always feasible to
employ the laboratory-based methods of implicit learning in applied contexts, which
makes uswonderwhy the techniquewouldever be suggested inapplied settings. Supporting
this argument, there is also a lack of exemplifying evidence to demonstrate an athlete achiev-
ing world-class or Olympic status through a genuinely implicit learning strategy. Thus, we
would question the contribution that implicit learning can make to skill establishment, or
to countering the A–P relationship in representative and competitive sport settings.
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Secondly, we suggest that the current conceptualization of this coaching dilemma
largely presented within the literature is in fact not wholly correct; that being, whether
skills should be taught explicitly or implicitly, with mechanics-oriented instruction
largely portrayed as common coaching practice (e.g., Porter, Wu, & Partridge, 2010).
Indeed, the same argument has also been made regarding the use of an internal or exter-
nal focus of attention (cf. Peh et al., 2011). At present, there is a strong sense within the
literature that implicit knowledge and external cues are good, and that explicit knowledge
and internal cues are bad (Masters & Maxwell, 2008; Wulf, 2013), therefore reﬂecting the
view that movements are either automatic or controlled. Taking our updated approach
provided within the fourth dimension opens up the possibility that both arguments are
correct, depending on what the athlete focuses on and how they focus. Undoubtedly,
however, while research continues to largely investigate conditions that degrade perform-
ance (i.e., a negative self-focus) versus those that do not (i.e., a positive self-focus), it is
unsurprising that such views have been formed. However, in attempting to exploit the
ideas contained within the skill establishment dimension, future research should
explore the positive self-focus as we have described it (cf. MacPherson et al., 2009) as a
strategy for facilitating the acquisition of more well-established motor skills. Based on
theory presented within the fourth dimension, coupled with applied evidence supporting
the beneﬁcial use of holistic and rhythmical patterns of thought, we suggest that these
bodies of knowledge could substantially contribute to such practice while also question-
ing the received wisdom of the advantages inherent in implicit learning.
In discussing these ideas with several colleagues and through comments received
during the peer-review process, the principle of analogy learning was brought to our atten-
tion as offering a potential contribution from the implicit learning literature (e.g., Lam et al.,
2009; Liao & Masters, 2001; Wing Kai, Maxwell, & Masters, 2009). Accordingly, it is important
to address this issue within the context of skill establishment. While we fully support the
use of analogies in coaching practice – indeed, they have been employed effectively for
many decades (e.g., Christina & Corcos, 1988; Knapp, 1963) – we do not believe that
they are underpinned by totally implicit control. Rather, analogies provide performers
with a positive self-focus that is explicitly attended to. This attention, however, is directed
to a more holistic representation of the skill. In other words, the analogy conveys sufﬁcient
information about the entire skill; that is, more information than focusing on a single aspect
of the movement. Provided that the analogy contains a high level of meaning to the per-
former and is motorically appropriate for the task at hand (i.e., conveys the important fea-
tures), it is unsurprising that research has concluded beneﬁcial effects. In advancing future
research in this area, it is worth considering how amultisensory analogy (or imagery) might
provide a greater number of conscious holistic retrieval cues.
Finally, and in addressing the practice requirements to develop long-term and robust
establishment of motoric structures during skill acquisition, we believe that existing litera-
ture has plenty to offer. While positive self-foci are clearly what we recommend a learner
should be thinking about, doing so in a fashion which promotes more elaborate encoding
and retrieval frequency has been supported by many theoretical accounts (Bjork & Bjork,
2006; Guadagnoli & Lee, 2004) and empirical research into motor learning (Schmidt &
Bjork, 1992). Indeed, as exemplar variables, manipulating practice schedules, feedback,
and demonstration material to better engage the learner’s attention with the desired
movement has been strongly advocated by research over the years (e.g., Salmoni,
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Schmidt, & Walter, 1984; Schmidt & Bjork, 1992; Williams & Hodges, 2005). Crucially, when
attempting to increase the establishment of a skill (once it has been encoded and stored
correctly), however, overlearning of these movements needs to take place in situations
that expose athletes to the types of symptoms experienced during anxiety, at least pro-
gressively to maintain stimulation during acquisition and to avoid stagnation (Richards,
2011). It is important that these representative conditions are encoded with the motor
memory trace; in fact, training under high-anxiety conditions to establish the skill requires
deliberate intent on the performer’s behalf since attentional resources are compromised
(cf. Beilock’s ﬁrst whammy). Indeed, training and succeeding under challenging conditions
has been reported by applied sport psychologists as a method of developing and main-
taining robust sport-conﬁdence (Beaumont, Maynard, & Butt, 2015).
In summary, we suggest the ﬁeld of coaching science needs to more critically consider
the beneﬁcial reuniﬁcation of motor control and sport psychology if it is to offer more
complete guidance to applied practice, something that has recently been exempliﬁed
within applied models of skill reﬁnement (cf. Carson & Collins, 2011). Such an approach
serves to capitalize on many decades of good empirical research and applied practice
without risking conceptual turmoil as a result of reinvention.
Conclusion
In focusing on motoric elements of performance, we hope to have shown that this fourth
dimension of the A–P relationship – how well the skill is established – has been neglected
or at least underweighted in the generation of new theory. In short, we believe that sport
psychology may have overly focused on emotions and cognition at the expense of move-
ment control (frontal lobe versus motor cortex sport psychology; cf. Collins & Kamin, 2012).
The overelaboration/explicit focus issues identiﬁed in existing models seem easily solved
by motoric and imagery literature (e.g., Paivio’s [1971, 1986] Dual-Coding Theory) and by
applied interventions which are supported by a range of empirical data (e.g., ‘sources of
information’; MacPherson et al., 2008) on holistic sensory cues (MacPherson et al., 2009).
Accordingly, we suggest that there is a positive potential ﬂow from applied/translational
to fundamental/theory-generating research in sport which can serve to freshen and use-
fully redirect investigation into this long-considered but still insufﬁciently understood
concept.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. When considering alternative A–P relationship theories (e.g., Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012) it is
likely that there could be scope for additional dimensions; the Skill Establishment dimension is
only acknowledged as the fourth in relation to Cheng et al.’s (2009) model.
2. Crucially, it must be recognized that such rhythms are individually preferred (MacPherson, Turner,
& Collins, 2007), another feature that needs to be catered for if genuinely motoric A–P investi-
gations are to be completed.
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3. From a methodological perspective, Bortoli et al. (2012) identiﬁed core components initially
through athlete self-report and then conﬁrmed/rejected the suggested focus using logistical
ordinal regression analysis. This calculates the probability of that component being associated
with optimal/suboptimal performance. While we do not take issue with employing this approach,
it may also be possible to ascertain such information using the uncontrolled manifold approach
(Scholz & Schöner, 1999), and through simple measures of intra-individual movement variability
(Carson, Collins, & Richards, 2014).
4. Information processed using the verbal system takes place sequentially, whereas processing
within the nonverbal system can be achieved in parallel. This distinction makes the nonverbal
system better at processing greater amounts of information simultaneously.
5. When learning skill components explicitly using verbal knowledge, knowledge related to many
different motor processes is still being generated implicitly (see Beek, 2000).
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